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An Economic Approach to the Psychology of Change:
Amnesia, Inertia, and Impulsiveness
Abstract
This paper models how imperfect memory affects the opti-
mal continuity of policies. We examine the choices of a player
(individual or firm) who observes previous actions but cannot
remember the rationale for these actions. In a stable environ-
ment, the player optimally responds to memory loss with excess
inertia, defined as a higher probability of following old poli-
cies than would occur under full recall. In a volatile environ-
ment, the player can exhibit excess impulsiveness (i.e., be more
prone to follow new information signals). The model provides
a memory-loss explanation for some documented psychological
biases, implies that inertia and organizational routines should
be more important in stable environments than in volatile ones,
and provides other empirical implications relating memory and
environmental variables to the continuity of decisions.
. . . the most radical revolutionary will become a conservative on the day after the revolu-
tion.
Hannah Arendt, The New Yorker, September 12, 1970.
Be not the first by whom the new are tried,
nor yet the last to lay the old aside.
Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism, 1711.
When I was younger I always conceived of a room where all these [strategic] concepts were
worked out for the whole company. Later I didn’t find any such room. . . . The strategy [of
the company] may not even exist in the mind of one man. I certainly don’t know where
it is written down. It is simply transmitted in the series of decisions made.
General Motors executive, quoted in Quinn (1980).
1 Introduction
The problem of memory loss permeates human choices, from the shopper trying to
remember which detergent cleans better to the newly-arrived manager trying to learn
the relevant aspects of his firm’s history. Yet there has been remarkably little research on
the consequences of such amnesia for economic decisions. This paper offers an economic
model of how memory loss affects the continuity of behavior.
An individual’s habits, an organization’s existing policies and routines, and a society’s
traditions are often firmly entrenched even when the rationales are not evident. Policies
are often maintained and even escalated despite opposing information (see, e.g., Arkes
and Blumer [1985], Ruef [1997]). Similarly, the non-adoption of a potential activity often
continues despite the arrival of favorable information. Several authors have argued that
firms commonly use hurdle rates that exceed the cost of capital, thereby discouraging
new projects (see references in Dixit [1992]). There is also strong evidence of inertia in
employees’ decisions of whether to participate in, and how much to contribute to 401(k)
retirement plans (Kusko, Poterba and Wilcox [1998]) and Madrian and Shea [2000]).
At the level of the firm, our paper offers a new theory of the determination of or-
ganizational continuity versus change in the face of memory loss.1 It seems plausible
1Rumelt (1994) argues that the issue of the optimal degree of organizational inertia is central to
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that firm behavior is most likely to change when a new manager arrives. However, a
new manager is likely to be hampered by lack of information about the source of past
decisions. In some cases, a new manager may infer that there is a good rationale for
past policies, even if he or she is not sure what that rationale is. If so, it may make good
sense to maintain, or at least carefully consider, the status quo.2
Even executives hired specifically to effect change, and ardent social reformers, usu-
ally perpetuate many of the policies of the regime they replace, limiting change to a
small set of high-profile issues. However, our primary focus is not upon the rare trau-
matic events in which managers are replaced in order to effect change and restructuring.
In such situations, the forces described here are likely to apply, but other effects may
be at least as important. Instead, we examine behavioral continuity versus change in
relation to the problems of memory loss regular faced by individuals and firms in the
ordinary course of life. Policy continuity is prevalent (if less striking) after routine losses
of memory that arise from imperfect communication, incomplete records, and routine
managerial transitions (for retirement, promotion, illness or other personal reasons).
At the individual level, experimental psychologists have identified action-induced
shifts in attitudes or beliefs, which has motivated the theory that individuals adjust
their beliefs to reduce cognitive dissonance. Our analysis is related to psychological
theories of self-attribution, the process by which people inferentially attribute reasons
or motives to themselves based upon observation/recall of their own actions and experi-
ences (Bem [1965]). In our approach, such inferences determine whether past behaviors
corporate strategy research, that managers should take into account a firm’s own inertia in evaluating
actions, and that strategic success is often due to the inertia of competitors as much as to the cleverness
of the innovator.
2For example, when RJR Nabisco CEO Louis Gerstner replaced John Akers as CEO of IBM following
a period of dramatically poor performance, Gerstner surprised observers by deciding not to embark on
a radical change of course. As an executive with a low-tech marketing background, Gerstner may have
initially lacked the expertise needed to critically evaluate existing IBM policies, and thus may have
been compelled to rely on these established policies. “...three months into the job, Gerstner has made
it clear that he has no intention of reconstructing IBM. Instead, the man everyone saw as the Great
Changemeister is determined, for the moment, to carry out a set of policies put in place by none other
than the much-maligned Akers.” [See “At IBM, More of the Same–Only Better? In Sales and Strategy,
Louis Gerstner Is Following John Akers’ Path,” Business Week, 7/26/93. According to this article,
Gerstner is “...still following through on Akers’ two-year-old restructuring.”
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continue. An individual who remembers his old actions, and presumes that there must
have been a good rationale for them will, under conditions that we delineate, exhibit
excess inertia.3 We discuss applications of the model to behaviors identified in exper-
imental psychology studies, such as action-induced belief changes, escalation and foot-
in-the-door biases, and the endowment effect in Section 5.4. Our basic approach views
individuals as optimally responsive to past memory loss.
Although inertia is common, it sometimes seems that individuals or organizations
are over-sensitive to new informations. Private individuals and managers are sometimes
criticized for mercurial or ‘weather-vane’ decision styles. Several competing theories of
organizational inertia are discussed in Section 6, but very few of these theories examine
the opposite phenomenon, which we term impulsiveness. We offer a model to explore
the conditions under which firms will be more or less responsive to new information, i.e.,
when inertia versus impulsiveness obtains. In our setting, patterns of inertia versus im-
pulsiveness can arise without any difference in tastes or characteristics of decisionmakers.
Rather, these are consequences of the characteristics of the decision environment.
The degree of behavioral continuity then depends on the balance between newly
arrived information and the pool of old information. A natural presumption is that
memory loss reduces the weight of old information in determining later actions. We
show that sometimes the opposite will be the case.
Our approach is based on the premise that past actions (policies, routines) are re-
membered well, while past information signals are remembered poorly. Actions are
more visible, salient, and memorable than underlying justifications. Information trans-
mission, absorption, and retention is costly, so the full reasons for past decisions are
often forgotten. Furthermore, organizations can lose access to old information even if
individual managers, like elephants, never forget. A decisionmaker with such differential
3A notable example of faulty reconstruction of reasons based on an action is provided by split brain
experiments. When an experimenter directs a command to a single brain hemisphere of a split brain
patient to get up, the other hemisphere (the verbal one) commonly invents and believes an imaginary
explanation for why the person has left his seat (Gazzaniga [1992]).
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recall must infer past signals from the coarse summary provided by past actions. Our
conclusions derive from the fact that this coarseness distorts later decisions—even when
the decisionmaker optimally adjusts for the resulting information loss.
The basic argument of the paper has two parts. First, suppose that an initial player
had adopted a policy for some time and that the new player—without access to his
predecessor’s information—must decide whether to adopt a similar action as he receives
a sequence of further signal realizations. The new player does not know how strongly his
predecessor’s information favored the original decision. Consequently, even if the new
player receives an opposing signal he will optimally tend to continue the old behavior
if the presumed favorable information of his predecessor outweighs the new signal. So
at first, he never switches. In contrast, in a benchmark regime of perfect recall, a
continuing player whose information happens to barely favor the initial project would
switch after even a single opposing signal. So in this situation a player with perfect
memory sometimes switches while one who recalls only past decisions never switches—
memory loss increases the stability of behavior.
More generally, as more signals accumulate, the new player will sometimes switch.
However, it is still the case, based on the initial player’s adoption decisions, the when
new player starts out he is not right near the borderline of rejecting. In contrast, a
continuing initial player who, despite his past series of adoptions, happened to have
a relatively adverse signal sequence starts out after the transition date very close to
the borderline of rejecting. Thus, even though beliefs are unbiased, there is a higher
probability of an action switch when there is no memory loss. (See also the discussion at
footnote 19). This situation—where the probability of an action change is lower when
the individual remembers only past actions than when he has full recall—is called excess
inertia under amnesia relative to a full recall regime.
The second part of the argument concerns forces that can weaken the inference that
should be drawn from the predecessor’s action. For example, if the gains to adopting a
project change stochastically, then an old choice that was correct may become incorrect
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later. A continuing player with perfect recall would in some cases know that the old
information was quite strong, and in such cases would follow old policies over new
signals. In contrast, a new replacement player may find it optimal to follow his own
signal regardless of past actions. In this changing-environment scenario amnesia causes
excess impulsiveness rather than inertia—an individual with poor memory of past signals
is more likely to switch behaviors than one with good memory.
In sum, our model of choice under memory loss provides implications about several
determinants of inertia versus impulsiveness. These include the information load an
individual must process, volatility of the decision environment, how long policies and
executives have been in place, and the quality of a firm’s information systems.
In modelling approach, the analysis is related to the informational cascades literature
of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [1992], Banerjee [1992], and Welch [1992]. Both
approaches assume a discrete action set, which coarsens the information available to a
decisionmaker who observes (or recalls) earlier decisions.4 The cascades outcome is an
extreme limiting case of what we call inertia: the individual is certain to follow past
actions and never accumulates enough information to change course. A key difference is
that here we examine not just the formation and dissolution of cascades, but the more
general issue of inertia versus impulsiveness—whether the probability that a player follows
past actions is increased or decreased by memory loss. This definition of inertia and
impulsiveness provides a way to analyze the continuity of behavior even when individuals
continue to use their own information. Even in circumstances in our model where a
cascade is impossible, inertia and impulsiveness occur. For example, when there are
many periods in our setting, all mistaken cascades must eventually break. Nevertheless,
we find medium- and long-run inertia.5 In contrast, in the original cascades model, in
4Even when choices are continuous, there is good psychological evidence that people often discretize
perceptions and conceptual categories. As the computer age has made clear, there are benefits to
digitizing. Psychologists have commented on how discretizing or quantizing categories aids discrimina-
tion, memory, and reasoning). Thus, even potentially continuous variables may be subject to action
distortions.
5We have also developed a simple two-period example with continuous signals in which cascades
never form; yet there is inertia. This highlights the fact that inertia is distinct from (though related
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a stable environment with identical individuals a cascade once started lasts forever; the
issue of inertia is not addressed.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses why actions
are likely to be recalled better than signals. Section 3 provides a basic five-period model
that examines the effect of environmental volatility. Section 4 considers many periods
to examine the effects of longer action histories and whether inertia or impulsiveness
can persist in the long-run. Section 5 discusses implications of the model based on the
value and sources of memory. Section 6 discusses alternative and related approaches.
Section 7 concludes. Proofs are in the appendix.
2 Are Actions Recalled Better Than Signals?
There is strong and consistent experimental evidence that individuals recall actions they
have performed better than verbal phrases.6 Better recall of actions than reasons makes
sense. Actions lead to more tangible consequences than discussion or thinking, and
hence are more salient. Salience increases memorability. Taking actions often requires
physical motion and personal interaction. Such activity causes arousal. Not surprisingly,
there is evidence that arousal at the time of a stimulus facilitates later recall.
Furthermore, memory is triggered by associations (see, e.g., Anderson and Bower [1973]).
A cue tends to trigger memories that are associated with similar cues. Each association
is a ‘hook’ which can trigger recall. Taking an action rather than just thinking about
or discussing it may create a wider set of associations. Rehearsal also promotes recall;
retrieving a memory increase the likelihood that the memory will be retrieved again in
the future. We argue that actions are often more likely to be retrieved than reasons.
For example, consider the purchase by a consumer of a brand of detergent based on
a friend’s claim that it is good at removing stains. The act of purchase creates arousal:
to) informational cascades.
6Relevant studies are surveyed by Engelkamp (1998), Engelkamp and Zimmer (1994), and Co-
hen (1989). In addition, Zimmer and Helstrup (2000) argue that an automatic ‘pop-out’ retrieval
mechanism (versus directed memory search) is is more effective for physical tasks than verbal tasks.
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at the market the consumer actively searches for and pays for the product. This activity
also creates associations: with the distinctive color of the box, the location in the store,
and the sight of the product with each use. Repeated purchase of the product provides
opportunities for rehearsal, making it easier to remember the product.
On the other hand, there can also be some recall of the reason for purchasing the
product. However, if the product is reasonably effective, there is no need for repeated
retrieval of the reason for purchase. A year later it may be hard to remember whether
the reason was stain-removing ability, low price, or gentleness on clothes.
At the organizational level, a similar phenomenon is likely to occur. Organizational
action requires arousal and attention by coordinating individuals. When an action is
taken and repeated, it leads to effects, and these effects provide repeated reminders of
what the action was that led to these effects. Actions are therefore salient, and involve
a richness of arousal, associations and rehearsal.7 A final reason for superior recall of
actions is that it is often easier to record and communicate clearly records of actual
actions than reasons for these actions—as indicated in the General Motors executive’s
description of corporate strategy at the head of this text.
3 The Shadow of History: The Basic Model
We now describe a stylized model of the shadow that the past actions history casts
on future behavior after a memory loss, and the factors that can deepen or dispel this
shadow. With imperfect memory a player cannot attune his policies perfectly to old
information. A new player observes only a coarse summary of what the previous player
knew, as reflected in past actions. We will show that if past actions are highly informa-
tive, a player with memory loss optimally exhibits excess inertia; if past actions are less
informative, the player may optimally exhibit excess impulsiveness; and if past actions
are very uninformative there is neither inertia nor impulsiveness.
7In some cases the reasons for actions are rehearsed as well. But such rehearsal will tend to decline
if the action becomes a routine, continuing policy.
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To illustrate simply, consider a player (individual or firm) who faces a sequence of five
identical decisions or ‘projects.’ The adoption value of each project, which is constant
through time, can be either good (value state φ = G) or bad (value state φ = B), with
equal ex-ante probability. Payoffs are perfectly correlated across projects, but are not
observed until the end of the game. A player observes a single new signal, H or L, each
period. If the underlying state is good, the player observes signal H with probability p
(p > 0.5), and L with probability 1−p. If the underlying state is bad, these probabilities
are reversed (see Table 1). Conditional upon the value state, the successive signals are
assumed to be statistically independent.8
Insert Table 1 here
In each period, the player chooses an action, either adopt (A), or reject (R). Net
payoffs are such that the player adopts (rejects) the project if state G is more (less)
likely than state B, and flips a fair coin when G and B are equally likely.9 To benchmark
behavior, we compare a full recall scenario, in which both actions and signals are retained
(i.e., the initial player I stays in place for all five periods and retains access to his old
information) to an amnesiac scenario, in which only actions are remembered (i.e., the
new player N can recall the two actions taken prior to the transition date (period 3),
but not the signals of his predecessor).10 Just before date 3, the underlying value of
adopting versus rejecting may change. Specifically, with probability σ, the state is
redrawn. If it is redrawn, with equal probability the new state is G or B. Thus,
Pr(φ′ = G|φ = G) = 1− (σ/2).
We first describe the transitional behavior of N versus I at date 3. There are four
8An alternative interpretation of the model would define actions A and R as expanding or shrinking
a project that is already in place, states G and B as higher and lower probabilities of getting a high
payoff per period, and signals H or L as immediately-observed high or low payoffs.
9For expositional simplicity we examine a symmetric setting, which leads to the possibility of indif-
ference and randomization. Qualitatively similar results apply when distributions are asymmetric.
10The model’s assumption that memory loss occurs at a single transition point fits the example of an
organization facing managerial turnover. Individual memory loss is also not completely steady. Individ-
uals experience discrete events such as relocations, and changes in jobs or mates, which reduce the fre-
quency of memory-triggering cues about pre-transition signals, and opportunities for memory-enhancing
rehearsal. However, the main motivation for the discrete-memory-loss assumption is tractability. We
conjecture that settings with steady memory decay would lead to similar effects.
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possible action patterns for the first two dates. AA can arise either from HH or HL,
and RR from either LL or LH. In contrast, AR can arise only from the single signal
sequence HL, and RA only from LH. So opposing actions allow N to infer perfectly that
the first two signals were opposed (HL or LH), and that a coin flip led to the second
action choice. Thus, under either full recall or amnesia, posterior beliefs are based on
the cancellation of the first two signals, and the date 3 player N follows his latest signal.
Since this is true under both full recall and amnesia, such realizations do not contribute
to inertia or impulsiveness. Thus, we focus on realizations where I follows like actions
for two dates, AA or RR. Like actions are likely to arise from like signals. AA could
arise either from HH, or from HL with a coin flip. RR could arise either from LL, or
from LH with a coin flip.
When volatility is low, the probability of an action switch under amnesia is zero,
whereas there is a positive probability of switch under full recall. Consider, for example,
the case of a fully stable environment (σ = 0). In an amnesia scenario where the
decisionmaker observes the past two actions but not signals, the new player draws a
favorable inference from AA (that the signals were HH or HL). Because of a high
likelihood that AA came from HH, even if he observes L, he still adopts.11 He knows
based on the first A that the first signal was H. This offsets his latest L signal. The
second A came from either an H or an L followed by a coin flip. The former is more
likely, since a coin flip could lead to R instead of A. Therefore, on balance it is more
likely that the state is G than B. Thus, under amnesia, N always adopts. Similarly,
after RR he always rejects. In these cases, N is in an informational cascade (i.e., his
action is independent of his signal). In contrast, if the two signals were indeed HL or
LH, a continuing player I with an opposing signal in the third period reverses course.
Insert Tables 2, 3 and 4 here
This outcome of excess inertia when environmental volatility is low is shown in the
second column in Table 2. Intuitively, in a stable environment (low σ), old policies
11Since p > 1/2, Pr(HH|AA) = 1−2p+2p
2




are very informative relative to new signals. It is therefore optimal for an amnesiac
individual to place heavy weight on the past, leading to inertia.
We now show that in a more rapidly changing environment, a full-recall player some-
times follows his old signal. (The full-recall player is more willing to put some weight on
the past because it knows past signals accurately instead of having to infer them from
action.) Thus, N tends to overreact to new information, and is too quick to reverse old
policies. In such an environment, memory improvements tend to make the player more
willing to retain old policies.
As environmental volatility increases (medium σ in Table 2), players place relatively
little weight on the past (either under full recall or amnesia). At some point, the relevance
of old policies to current decisions weakens just enough that an amnesiac player always
follows his new signal. In contrast, at this point a continuing I does not always follow
his latest signal. (Specifically, if prior signals overwhelmingly favored a project, I sticks
with that project.) Therefore memory loss causes impulsiveness. As volatility increases,
a point is reached for N (σ = σN) where a single L signal outweighs the information
implicit in AA (which could have arisen from HH or HL). N then always follows his
own signal without regard to the past. In contrast, since I has more refined information
about the past, when he observes strongly favorable past information HH, he adopts
even if his third signal is L. Thus, in this range of σ amnesia causes impulsiveness.
Finally, for a highly unstable environment (high σ in Table 2), even past signals have
weak relevance for the future, so even a full-recall player will follow the new signal. In
other words, an L signal not only outweighs two AA signals but also two HH signals.
Since I or N behave identically, there is neither excess inertia nor impulsiveness. This
reasoning suggests the following result:
Proposition 1 In the model with possible environmental shifts, the critical value for σ
above which the player always follows the date 3 signal is larger for the full-recall player
than for amnesia player, σN < σI . Thus, if the probability of a value shift is:
(1) low, σ < σN , under memory loss the player exhibits excess inertia;
(2) intermediate, σN < σ < σI , the player exhibits excess impulsiveness;
(3) high, σI < σ, there is neither excess impulsiveness nor inertia. At date 4, there is
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inertia for all σ < 1, and first-best behavior if σ = 1. At date 5, as at date 3 there is
inertia for low σ, impulsiveness for all intermediate values of σ, and first-best behavior
for high σ.
This proposition describes the conditions that promote impulsiveness versus inertia.
Firms in relatively stable industries are predicted to be excessively inert, and those in
more rapidly-changing industries such as computing and telecommunications to exhibit
less inertia, and perhaps impulsiveness.12 This is especially the case when employee job
mobility (and loss of firm-specific memory) is high, e.g., as in Silicon Valley during the
rise of personal computing and the internet. Part (3) of the proposition seems to be an
extreme case; it is unlikely that many individuals or industries are in environments so
volatile that past signals are uniformly useless.13
Environmental instability causes the value of information to decay, because informa-
tion about the past value state becomes less relevant for the current adoption decision.
Thus, even with full recall it is no surprise that instability leads to greater change. The
interesting point is that amnesia exaggerates the importance of old signals in a stable
environment, and the importance of new signals in a fairly volatile one.
Intuitively, amnesia coarsens information about the past, thereby rendering the
player less aware of unusual circumstances. If the information reflected in past ac-
tions is quite informative for the future, deviation from past actions is seldom needed.
Past actions are followed frequently; it is worth taking the risk that this is a mistake,
Similarly, if past actions are not very informative, it is optimal to follow past actions
12Thus, Henry Ford’s view that “History is more or less bunk... We don’t want tradition... the only
history that is worth a tinker’s damn is the history we make today,” is more appropriate to the Ford of
1916 than the Ford of today.
13Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [1992] provided a numerical example of informational cascades
with stochastic environmental shifts, to show the possibility of what they called “fads” (somewhat
analogous to impulsiveness here). Our analysis goes further to analyze systematically how continuity
of behavior changes as volatility changes. We show that there is sometimes a non-monotonic pattern
(inertia, impulsiveness, first-best) as volatility rises; and that sometimes higher volatility reduces in-
ertia but does not actually cause impulsiveness. The BHW example fixed the environmental change
probability, which precluded such analysis. Also, the BHW calculation examined the probability of a
long-run shift from one cascade to another cascade. Immediately after the environmental shock, in their
example a cascade is impossible. So the BHW calculation says nothing whatsoever about short-term
impulsiveness versus inertia immediately after the shock. Here we examine impulsiveness versus inertia
both in the short-term and at longer lags.
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seldom, and bear the risk that this is a mistake. Thus, coarse information causes a kind
of overshooting. Conditions that, under full recall, favor low (high) weight upon past
information can cause excess impulsiveness (excess inertia) when memory is lost.
Reasoning broadly similar to that for date 3 decisions applies at dates 4 and 5 as
well. At date 5, there is still a progression as environmental volatility rises from inertia
to impulsiveness to first-best decisions. However, it is no longer the case that inertia
is associated with a certainty of following past actions, it is just that the probability of
doing so is increased by memory loss. At date 4, the progression is from strong inertia
to weaker inertia to first-best; the region of actual impulsiveness vanishes.14
These findings suggest why certain factors affect the shadow of the past. We have
just seen that since environmental volatility weakens the informativeness of old actions
for the future, high volatility tends to cause greater impulsiveness. Furthermore, we have
shown in an analysis similar to the basic model that if there is only a probability each
period that a player receives a meaningful signal, then even in a stable environment
there can be impulsiveness. The possibility that past actions are based on relatively
little information reduces the weight on them relative to a new signal (if a new signal is
received). On the other hand, the next section examines a factor that can intensify the
weight placed on the past, a longer pre-transition action history.
4 Long-Term Effects of Amnesia
So far we have assumed a fairly short history prior to memory loss (two dates), and have
examined only one decision immediately after memory loss. We have therefore allowed
history to cast only a short shadow (a few periods). We now examine whether such
behavior can persist in the long term. Furthermore, we examine how the length of the
14Intuitively, at date 4 post-transition information is either powerful (two like signals) or else com-
pletely uninformative (two opposing signals). The case of precisely offsetting signals contributes toward
inertia by encouraging someone with partial recall to follow past actions, but someone with full recall to
flip a coin if pre-transition signals were equally split. But when the number of post-transition periods
becomes large, the case of a precisely equally-split set of post-transition signals becomes very unlikely.
This reasoning suggests that impulsiveness region will be present for odd numbers of periods and when
the number of periods is reasonably large.
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project adoption history (how well-established the existing policy is) affects long-term
inertia versus impulsiveness. We therefore extend the model to many periods before and
after the memory loss, but simplify by assuming a stable environment. We will show
that the longer an action is established by the initial player, the greater the inertia; but
that there is excess inertia even for fairly recently established policies.
4.1 A Multiperiod Decision Setting
This section differs from the basic model in three ways. First, it allows for any number
of periods either before or after the memory loss (player transition) date. Second, the
environment is stable (σ = 0). Third, for analytical convenience we allow a third action
choice (see below).
In each of a number of discrete periods, the current decision-maker (individual or
firm) has to choose publicly an action, either to adopt the project (A), reject the project
(R), or abstain from decision (∅). There are two possible value states, G and B, which
are constant through time. Players adopt if G is more likely than B, reject if B is more
likely than G, and abstain if G and B are equally likely.15 The appendix describes a
simple payoff structure such that this behavior is optimal.
As before, the player’s prior belief is that G and B are equally likely, and each period
the player receives one private signal, H or L. Payoffs are revealed only when the game
ends. The signal structure is summarized in Table 1 of the previous subsection. Define
the signal state of I at time t as the difference between the number of H and L signals
that he observes, st ≡ nH − nL (in t draws).16 Thus, conditional on the unknown value
state, the player’s signal state follows a Markov process. The tie value st = 0 is the point
where the player switches from either A or R to ∅. The appendix derives the probability
15As in Section 3 (see footnote 9), our simplifying assumption of symmetry leads to the possibility of
exact indifference. Introducing the (somewhat artificial) option of abstaining simplifies the algebra and
discussion by eliminating randomization, tie-breaking rules or assumed asymmetry. We have derived
similar results when there is no option of abstention, and distributions are asymmetric.
16For example, if I observed HHLHL, he is in signal state +1 at date 5. Given the value state (G or
B), the transition probabilities from signal state s to s+ 1 or s−1 are just the conditional probabilities
of another H or L signal being observed.
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of reaching st = 0 given an information set.
Suppose I has been in place for M periods. For N, observing I’s past actions (adopt,
reject or abstain) is equivalent to observing only whether the signal-states s1, . . . , sM
were above, below or equal to 0. We call abstention an action switch, since the player
shifts from preferring one action to being indifferent. Whenever an action switch occurs,
N perfectly infers I’s signal state to be zero at the switch date.
Since adopt and reject are symmetric, we focus on the consequences of past adoption.
We wish to determine whether past actions are continued more in the different scenarios.
We therefore calculate the probability of actions conditional upon the individual having
observed a sequence of exactly M uninterrupted adopt decisions immediately preceding
the memory loss event.17
Definition The equivalent state ē for a new or continuing player is the minimum
number of consecutive opposing a signals (L-signals for an adopting player, H-signals
for a rejecting player) required for the player to switch action to abstain or beyond.
For a continuing I, the equivalent state is the same as the signal state.
4.2 Transitional, Medium and Long-Term Inertia
We now compare the likelihood of action changes under amnesia (a change in players)
to the full recall scenario where I remains in place. Just after a transition, N with
amnesia has an equivalent state that depends only on the action history. We denote
the equivalent state as e[M, p] as a function of the number of past adoptions and the
signal precision. The next proposition shows that a player with amnesia initially is inert
(relative to a full-recall player):
Proposition 2 Conditional on M prior adopt decisions, a new player never switches
before time M + e(M, p) periods, whereas there is a strictly positive probability that a
continuing player switches by time M + 2, where e(M, p) ≥ 2 for M > 2.
17This is without loss of generality, because the signal state is zero whenever there is an act of
abstaining. For example, suppose there have been 100 past actions, ending with the string ∅AAAA.
The first 95 actions are irrelevant (the abstain demonstrates 48 H’s and 48 L’s, which jointly are
uninformative about the value state) for N, so this history is equivalent to one where N = 4 and a
string of 4 A’s has occurred.
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(For M ≤ 2, N makes a perfect inference and consequently behaves like I.) Intuitively,
after a sequence of M adopts by I, N does not know how strong the evidence was in
favor of adopting. At best there could have been M consecutive H signals; at worst there
could have been close to equal numbers of H and L signals. N will infer statistically that
the signal state is likely to be intermediate between these extremes. If M is sufficiently
large, N believes it is unlikely I was very near the borderline, so he does not switch
actions after observing just a single L signal. But a continuing I who has observed the
actual sequence might have been right on the borderline. So if there was only very weak
evidence supporting the current action, a continuing I switches action based on one or
only a few opposing signals with positive probability. Since N is more likely to switch
than a continuing I, there is excess inertia. This intuition suggests that the result of
transitional inertia (which was the focus of Section 3) is quite robust with respect to
assumptions about signal structure and value distribution.
Does inertia persist beyond the first few decisions? Sequences of signal realizations
exist such that N switches when I does not, and vice versa.18 We therefore compare the
probability of an action switch over a given period of time for N versus I. Asymptotically,
N exhibits excess inertia:
Proposition 3 (i) Holding constant the number M > 3 of immediately consecutive
prior adoptions, as t → ∞, the probability that the new player reverses action at least
once is less than or equal to the probability that the continuing player does so. (ii) Holding
constant the number M ′ > 3 of periods before the transition (which may include A or
R), as t→∞, the probability that the new player reverses action at least once is strictly
less than the probability that a continuing (full recall) player does so.
Intuitively, if the player begins with the wrong action, then with either full recall or
amnesia (I or N), as information accumulates, eventually there will be a switch to
the right action. In this case there is no difference. Suppose instead that the player
begins with the right action. Then, under full recall, often the player begins close to the
18N may switch when a continuing I would have maintained, if N thinks that I’s signals were only
moderately favorable to the old policy, whereas the actual signal sequence strongly favored the old
action. For example, suppose that I adopted three times based on sequence HHH. N thinks the
sequence was either HHH or HHL. If N observes two further L’s, he may abstain. I would not do so.
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decision boundary, and switches temporarily to the wrong action along the way. This
is less common under amnesia because forgetting of past signals compresses N’s beliefs
away from the edge of the decision boundary. Thus, we have shown that for a period
immediately after the transition, and also in the asymptotic long run many periods after
the transition, memory loss causes excess inertia.19
Although we have no general proof, for an intermediate time period T after the
switch, extensive simulations uniformly indicate that the probability that N switches is
strictly below the probability that I switches for any M ≥ 3. (For M < 3, N perfectly
infers I’s information and so behaves identically to a continuing I.) Thus, inertia obtains
uniformly. The cumulative switch probabilities in the two scenarios are graphed for
different parameter values in Figures 1 and 2.20 The uniformly higher probability of
switch under full recall illustrates inertia in the short, medium and long terms.
4.3 Strategic Signalling
So far, we have assumed that I maximizes expected profits each period. However, it may
pay for a player to sacrifice short-run profit to improve future decisions. If a transition is
foreseen, then I can adjust his policies as a function of his information in a sort of code
to communicate with his later self, who lacks access to I’s information signals. Such
behavior can be termed strategic signaling. One appealing such code would require I,
right before the transition, to act in opposition to the preponderance of evidence if he is
close to indifference. The expected cost is low since incorrect decision-making are made
when the choice is almost a toss-up. We have shown by example that the benefit from
such strategic signalling sometimes outweighs the cost. However, in practice it may be
19The opposite case where, under full recall, the player begins far from the decision boundary, con-
tributes to a higher frequency of a temporary switch to a wrong action. However, the two cases do not
offset. It is very easy starting near a decision boundary to cross it by chance—even if the drift is away
from the boundary. This is relatively unlikely starting far from the boundary. So the case in which the
full recall player is close to the decision boundary is a more likely contributor to action changes than
the case in which he is far from the boundary.
20Because of the noisiness of the signal, the cumulative probabilities are close to, but do not asymp-
tote to, 1.0 in Figures 1 and 2. Excess inertia holds uniformly for the union of M = 4, 32, 64 and
p = 0.5001, 0.51, 0.6, 0.75, 0.9. All results have been both computed from the described formulas and
confirmed in simulations (using the computed equivalent state decision rule).
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hard to motivate a manager contractually to make incorrect project choices in order to
communicate information to his successor (see also Section 5).21
At the level of individual decisions, it is a commonplace that people do not always
allow sufficiently for memory loss: misplaced keys and circuitous automobile searches
for previously-visited locations are obvious examples. Casual observation suggests that
people seldom intentionally take the wrong action to signal to their later selves. Fur-
thermore, there is psychological evidence that in making current decisions, individuals
sometimes ignore predictable future changes in their mental states.22
5 Sources and Value of Memory
In the examples that follow, we do not claim that memory loss is the unique consideration—
agency and other issues are clearly important. However, since these alternative expla-
nations are more familiar, we generally omit them here. A comparison of the range of
empirical applicability of alternative theories is offered in Section 6.
The inefficiencies in our model can be eliminated if I accurately records the signal
state and communicates it to N. Thus, our model is most applicable for policies for
which information is hard to record, store, retrieve, and transmit. Several studies de-
scribe factors leading to imperfect individual and organizational memory.23 Fear of legal
liability and ‘paper trails’ discourages record-keeping, implying that industries that are
vulnerable to litigation should be more prone to problems of amnesia.
Amnesia in organizations is likely to be more severe when decisionmaking capacity
21According to Huber (1991), “Everyday observations make clear (1) that personnel turnover creates
great loss for the human components of an organization’s memory;,” and “(2) that nonanticipation of
future needs for certain information causes great amounts of information not to be stored... or not to
be stored such that it can be easily retrieved... .”
22People exaggerate the resemblance of their prospective future feelings and preferences in different
situations to their current feelings and preferences (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, Rabin (2000) analyze
this projection bias). Furthermore, “People underappreciate how their own behavior and exogenous
factors affect their future utility.” Although memory and preferences are different, this evidence is
suggestive that people may also fail to engage in sophisticated forms of signalling in order to influence
their own later selves.
23E.g., individual: Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982), and Nisbett and Ross (1980)); organiza-
tional: Huber [1991], Han [1997]).
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is under a severe information load, when there is a long time lag between related deci-
sions, for decisions that depend on confidential or legally-sensitive information, and for
decisions that are hard to foresee. The theory implies that it is these firms in which
inertia and impulsiveness are likely to most important (inertia for venerable policies in
stable environments, impulsiveness for recent policies in volatile environments).
5.1 Information Technology and Record-Keeping
Owing to a high turnover rate, “reverse engineering” the software developed by departed
programmers is a growing problem (Peterson [1993]). Although it is easy to communicate
the actions of individual programs (or major subroutines) to a new programmer, it is
usually difficult to understand the detailed rationale for specific pieces of code. This
limits the ability of a new programmer to make major changes in old code.24 This effect
can lock a firm into an unwieldy information system.
The introduction of groupware and knowledge management systems at many firms
provides natural experiments on the effects of improvements in organizational mem-
ory. Such software facilitates the recording, retrieval and transmission of transactions
and decisions.25 If effective, groupware should reduce inertia and impulsiveness. Our
analysis therefore predicts that introduction of groupware and other knowledge manage-
ment procedures will reduce inertia for firms in stable industries, but in more volatile
environments will increase stability (by reducing impulsiveness).
Several authors in the strategy literature have argued that small firms tend to be
more flexible in production, swift, and willing to innovate than large firms.26 It has
been argued that larger firms may be insulated from changing competitive conditions
by a greater stock of slack resources (Cyert and March [1963]), that bureaucracy and
24Subroutines and lines of code can have hidden rationales and side effects that make them difficult for
a later programmer to understand, or even for the original programmer to revisit. Indeed, the movement
first to procedural languages and now to object-oriented programming (see, e.g., Forbes ASAP, 12/2/96,
p. 187) encourages modularization to reduce the need to make any changes to old code.
25The economic importance of electronic knowledge management is highlighted by IBM’s 1995 $3.3
billion acquisition of Lotus in order to acquire Lotus’ Notes software.
26See Katz [1970], Cohn and Lindberg [1974], MacMilan [1980], and Fiegenbaum and Karnani [1991].
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organizational complexity can make a large firm less responsive to environmental change
(March [1981]), and that smaller firms have a greater need to compete aggressively
(Aldrich and Auster [1986]).
Empirically, firm size is related to the probability of change in core characteristics of
firms, R&D spending, and innovation.27 Acs and Audretsch (1988) find that in most of
the industries they examined, most innovations came from larger firms, but that in some
industries the reverse was the case. Chen and Hambrick (1995) find that smaller airlines
have greater speed and readiness to initiate competitive challenges, but are slower to
respond to a competitive initiative than are larger competitors.
From the perspective of our approach, managerial specialization and the spreading
of decision-making in large firms probably leads to a relatively steady rate of forgetting
of decision rationales in large firms as managers depart. In contrast, small firms run
by small entrepreneurial teams are likely to have very good memory when no turnover
occurs, and very poor memory when an executive leaves. Thus, our approach predicts
that small entrepreneurial firms should usually be more agile than large bureaucratic
firms, but with occasional bursts of extreme inertia or impulsiveness.
Furthermore, scale economies in memory systems create an advantage for larger firms.
These arise from the fixed costs of computerizing, introducing sophisticated internal
accounting systems, and hiring specialized managers. This memory advantage should
increase the nimbleness of large firms relative to small firms in reacting to change. The
possibility that large firms can be nimbler contrasts with the theoretical arguments in
much of the strategy literature.28
27See Kelly and Amburgey (1991), Cohen and Klepper (1993), Acs and Audretsch (1988), and Hitt,
Hoskisson and Areland (1990).
28Empirical study of these issues requires attention to a possible a post-selection bias. Small firm
that suffers drastic memory loss will often die. There is a tendency to compare large firms only with
surviving small competitors, meaning those who were successful ex post. This may contribute to the
popular view that small firms track environmental shifts more adeptly than large firms.
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5.2 Executive Mobility and Succession
Our focus is not on traumatic involuntary replacements of managers designed to effect
change. Such cases obviously involve effects outside our model. However, organizational
theorists have emphasized the disruptive effects even of routine managerial succession
(e.g., Grusky [1960]). Furthermore, the announcement of voluntary CEO departures
without pressure by the board is on average associated with negative abnormal stock
returns (Furtado [1989]). This evidence is consistent with memory loss being costly to
firms. Two trends suggest that the problems that arise from memory loss may be of
great importance: the increasing tendency of large U.S. firms to hire outsider CEO’s and
directors, and the movement toward elimination of middle-management levels through
downsizing.29 The high rate of environmental change and management turnover in high
tech industries imply severe problems of memory loss, and high impulsiveness.
Corporate boards of directors are reservoirs of memory when there is turnover. This
provides a rationale for insider presence on the board. Opposed to this memory advan-
tage is the value of disinterested external oversight. Not surprisingly, the board’s memory
is imperfect. The notorious reluctance of directors to remove poorly performing CEOs
is consistent with excess inertia. Our analysis implies that in volatile environments,
inertia vanishes and impulsiveness may result. Thus, entrepreneurs financed by venture
capitalists may be removed more often than would be optimal under full recall.
Our theory implies that firms whose managers are routinely more mobile, retire ear-
lier, and are hired from the outside have stronger inertia or impulsiveness than firms
that provide lifetime employment, groom managers for promotion, and have late retire-
ment age. While employee mobility allows firms to adjust labor usage easily, it may
29According to The Economist (4/20/96 pp. 51-2) in an article entitled “Fire and Forget?,” “Having
spent the 1990s in the throes of restructuring, re-engineering and downsizing, American companies
are worrying about corporate amnesia.” The article provides several anecdotal examples of firms which
achieved leaner workforces but failed to improve performance, apparently because of loss the information
possessed by key employees. Similarly, according to Forbes ASAP, 12/4/95, “Companies that went
overboard ‘rightsizing’ are now desperately trying to keep experienced hands to steady the ship.” An
article in Forbes 2/10/97 p. 64 entitled “Ford’s boss-a-year plan” attributes poor performance at Ford
Europe to its treatment of the top Europe position as a temporary stepping stone (ten bosses in 18
years), and consequent inertia.
20
cause undesirable memory loss and lead to inertia or impulsiveness in decision-making.
Factors that might seem to entrench the status quo—low turnover, internal promotion,
and late retirement ages— can therefore sometimes improve the firm’s ability to adapt.
A more distinct implication of our approach concerns organizational decision styles.
Consensus management distributes memory about reasons for decisions (not just the
decisions themselves) among more participants. This reduces the memory loss associated
with turnover. Similarly, the benefits of functional specialization within a management
team must be balanced against the memory loss when a key member departs.
Turnover should impose lower average amnesia costs on large than on small firms,
owing both to steadier proportionate turnover and scale economies in information man-
agement systems. This analysis therefore implies that large firms should adopt policies
more conducive to employee turnover. Grusky (1961) finds that turnover rates are indeed
higher in larger firms.
5.3 The Value of Memory
The importance of memory loss is evidenced by the resources devoted to information
preservation by many means.30 Our approach implies that the extent to which individu-
als and firms use costly devices for improving memory depends on the value of full recall
over recall of actions but not signals. Consider a firm that faces repeated environmental
shifts, and repeatedly loses memory of past signals. If the probability of a value shift is
quite low, then the past history of actions is highly informative about the value state.
Thus, the value of full recall of signals in addition to actions poop is modest. If volatility
is quite high, past history of any sort has little relevance for the future, so again the gain
to preserving past signals is low.31 Thus, the value of full recall is greatest for players
30These include files, personal information managers, minutes, memos, secretaries, accounting sys-
tems, expert systems, groupware (e.g., email, document management, workflow management, and
knowledge sharing), establishment of knowledge management systems and Chief Knowledge Officer
positions for preservation of organizational memory (see, e.g., Business Week 6/10/96, p. 6, and Forbes
ASAP, 8/24/98, p. 92), and deferral of employee retirement. An impressive example is the extensive
cataloging activity of Ernst and Young’s 200-person Center for Business Knowledge.
31Consistent with this argument, Moorman and Miner (1997) report evidence from 92 new product
development projects that survey-based proxies for better and more dispersed organizational memory
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who face intermediate environmental volatility. The general trend (cited earlier) among
U.S. firms toward hiring outsider CEO’s since the 1960’s could, in part, be related to
reduced value of memory in a more volatile, globalizing business environment.
When a firm does poorly, executives and employees are tempted to leave. Departures
carry away memory, which causes the firm to make more mistakes. Thus, memory loss
effects can accelerate the collapse of distressed firms. Consistent with such a ‘death
spiral’ of memory loss, in a sample of distressed firms, Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992)
found rapid and accelerating divergences in managerial team characteristics (such as
team size, average managerial tenure in the firm, and functional expertise mix) between
failing firms and matched survivors in the years preceding bankruptcy. These variables
are possible memory proxies. Our approach implies that such problems of amnesia are
likely to be especially important for service firms, for which a greater part of organiza-
tional memory resides in individuals’ minds rather than written records.
5.4 Applications to Individual Behavior
There is extensive evidence that people have imperfect access to and recall of the reasons
for their actions, and thus that a process of inference is required to form an imperfect
reconstruction.32 Corner et al (1994) describe the parallels between organizational level
and individual level information storage and retrieval mechanisms. In this context,
our theory can help explain (and offer alternative reasons for) such effects as action-
induced belief changes (in contrast with the cognitive dissonance reduction theory for
such phenomena, see Festinger [1957]); see also Akerlof and Dickens [1982]), escalation
bias i.e., excessive continuation and extension of old beliefs and policies (Arkes and
Blumer (1985)) and foot-in-the-door effects (Gorassini and Olson (1995)), and endow-
ment effects (wherein the assignment of ownership of an object to an individual increases
his valuation of the object (Kahneman et al (1990)).
are associated with good short term financial performance of new products, but that under conditions
of high environmental turbulence the positive effect of high memory dispersion disappears.
32Wilson, Hodges and LaFleur (1995) discuss this literature; Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) review the
large general literature on memory as a reconstructive process).
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Common to these effects is an excessive adherence to past states of mind or behaviors.
The endowment effect can operate even if there is no time delay, which casts doubt on
a memory loss explanation. However, we would argue that effective memory loss often
occurs immediately after an action. So long as the individual finds it difficult or tiresome
to access the reasons for his decision, his future decisions reflect incomplete access to
old reasons.33 In any case, by relating such behaviors to (measurable) proxies for recall
and to environmental volatility, our explanation can be distinguished empirically from
alternative hypotheses.
6 Other Theories
This section compares our theory with several alternative and complementary theories.
Several theories of individual and organizational inertia and conservatism are based on
other deviations from perfect rationality; see, e.g., Thaler (1980), and the reviews of
Kuran (1988) and Rumelt (1994). Such invalid use of information that the individual
has ample opportunity to absorb (as in theories of irrational aversion to change) should
be distinguished from a response of reasonable individuals to their own inability to
broadcast or absorb information (implicit in a failure of organizational memory).
The effects of limited memory were previously studied by Dow (1991) in a paper
on the decision problem of a consumer looking for the lowest price. His focus was on
the endogenous choice of what to remember. In independent work, Mullainathan (1998)
also applies memory loss to economic issues. He examines individuals who apply Bayes’
rule to a selectively recalled signal history as if it were the true one. Our approach
differs in two main respects. First, we examine inertia versus impulsiveness. Second,
in our model, decisionmakers apply Bayes’ rule properly subject to the single cognitive
limitation of amnesia. In a recent paper, Sarafidis (2000) applies principles of rehearsal
and association to develop a model of memory. He applies this to the issue strategic
timing of information disclosures in order to manipulate the resulting memories of a
33It is also possible that past problems of imperfect recall may have caused selection for emotional
mental mechanisms that influence choices between continuation and change.
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forgetful agent. In contrast, we examine a single-agent model
Actual behavior is of course influenced by a combination of factors. Managers are
sometimes hired specifically to bring about policy changes, which raises issues outside
our model. To control for such effects, organizational tests of our model should focus
on more common and routine forms of managerial turnover (e.g., retirements, voluntary
departures or death rather than firing).
In an overview, Rumelt (1994) opposes organizational inertia (persistence) to plas-
ticity, a readiness to respond appropriately to environmental change. Thus, inertia (or
lack of plasticity) is an obstacle to optimal behavior. This categorization implicitly
excludes the possibility that firms sometimes place undue weight on new information
(impulsiveness) and hence adjust behavior too readily.
The organizational ecology literature generally assumes that firms do not change,
and focuses on how populations of firms are modified through processes of creation
and selection.34 This approach contrasts with an adaptionist perspective which em-
phasizes organizational change in response to the environment (see, e.g., Nelson and
Winter [1982]). Our theory offers a middle path by predicting a degree of inertia.
Some theories of inertia are based on divergence of interests between different decision-
makers (see e.g., Rasmusen [1994]). For example, a manager may take actions in order
to persuade observers that he has high ability.35 Our analysis is based on information
loss rather than influencing the beliefs of others, and therefore does not require that the
decisionmaker be observed by others. Our theory shares with Prendergast and Stole’s
the implication that the old should be more conservative. In our setting this is because
the old have poorer memory and a longer action history, rather than a reputation-based
attachment to positions they have staked out.36
34Hannan and Freeman (1984) justify this inertia assumption based on the tendency of organizations
to institutionalize procedures to maintain reliability. In our approach, high stability is an optimal
response to memory loss only in a stable environment.
35See Prendergast and Stole [1996], and Zwiebel [1995]. In Zwiebel, a manager sometimes avoids
a superior innovative project. In Prendergast and Stole, a manager initially uses information too
aggressively, and later adheres too strongly to past decisions.
36This discussion does not exhaust the list of significant alternative approaches. In Kuran (1987),
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Dixit (1992) offers an options theory of inertia based upon the benefit of defer-
ring costly changes until further information arrives. His theory implies that inertia is
strongest in a highly volatile environment. In our theory, volatile environmental change
opposes inertia and can lead to its opposite, impulsiveness.
As this discussion indicates, our theory differs from alternative theories in its predic-
tion of which variables favor inertia or impulsiveness. Indeed, past research has devoted
little attention to the possibility of impulsiveness. The variables suggested by our model
include information load, managerial mobility, managerial overlap, and the quality of
information storage/retrieval systems (see, e.g., the predicted effects of introduction of
Groupware in Subsection 5.1). In contrast with several reputational theories, our ap-
proach implies that high managerial attachment to a project can lead to impulsiveness,
not inertia, depending on the memory and environmental variables mentioned earlier.
Furthermore, the analysis offers implications about which firms should investment more
in retaining organizational memory (see Subsection 5.3).
7 Summary and Extensions
Casual observation and extensive evidence from psychology suggest that memory loss
frequently affects decision outcomes. Our paper examines the implications of memory
loss for the continuity of behavior over time. We find that excess inertia and impulsive-
ness are optimal responses to memory loss. Thus, intervention or legislation designed
to oppose inertia or impulsiveness, such as requiring or blocking change, would, in the
absence of extra information, reduce decision quality. Behavior which may seem to re-
flect faulty cognitive strategies (e.g., escalation bias, action-induced belief changes) can
alternatively be understood as reasonable responses to memory constraints.
Memory loss occurs at both the individual and organizational levels. Firms lose
individual preference or social pressure cause conformity. This results in periods of stability interrupted
by occasional large shifts. Our model focuses on a problem of inference rather than one of social pressure.
Rasmusen [1992] provides a statistical model in which a manager should be conservative in undertaking
new projects because of measurement error in project quality and the regression phenomenon.
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information both from individual managerial amnesia, from turnover, and failures in
communication and record-keeping. How information retention affects organizational
policies is of growing importance as modern economies shift to services and information
management, and as restructuring causes managerial and employee turnover.
Our model is based on the premise that a ‘new player’ (an individual after memory
loss, or a firm’s new manager) can observe/recall previous actions but not the rationale
for these actions. We show that memory loss not only leads to poorer decisions, but
causes sensible individuals (who adjust optimally for past memory loss) to adjust their
proclivity to follow or deviate from past policies. When the environment is stable, and
if a player has followed an old policy a long enough time, there is excess inertia: as
new information arrives the player optimally tends to maintain old policies more under
amnesia (e.g., a new player) than with full recall (e.g., a continuing initial player). Thus,
the model implies that individual habits, organizational routines and cultural norms that
institutionalize inertia should be more extensive and effective in stable than in volatile
environments. Under the opposite set of circumstances, i.e., when the value of old
information is weak and/or decays over time, there is excess impulsiveness: an amnesiac
player optimally shifts policies more often than would a full-recall player.
The analysis identifies several forces which can intensify or dispel the shadow of
the past: the age (duration) of the activity or policy; the volatility of the decision
environment; the quality of information (both new and old); the information-load; the
amount of managerial and employee turnover; and the quality of record-keeping and
information systems. Some of the resulting empirical implications are diametrically
opposed to competing theories (see Section 6).
Although the focus of the model is on loss of memory about past signals, some-
times amnesia is so severe that past actions and signals are both lost. This possibility
creates a benefit to institutionalizing past decisions through traditions, taboos, ritu-
als, conventions, organizational routines and cultural norms. It could be argued that
such institutions are designed to protect against hostile, unpredictable environments.
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However, our approach implies that such traditions will thrive in highly stable environ-
ments, where inertia is an optimal response to memory loss. In such environments, the
institutionalization of inertia (and consequent loss of flexibility) has relatively low cost.
Explicit analysis of how memory loss affects economic choices promises to be fruitful
for a wide range of applications. We close by mentioning four. (1) The determination of
brand loyalty of consumers. Our approach suggests that it is in the interests of sellers to
exploit imperfect memory and inertia. Obviously, advertisers repeatedly remind people
of the brand to encourage later recall. More interestingly, the theory implies that it is
useful to remind the consumer that he chose the brand.37 (2) Project recommendation
within organizations. Loss of information between hierarchical levels can be viewed as
a kind of memory loss. (3) The formation of individual habits and social traditions
when there are repeated rounds of memory loss. Finally, (4) The feedback from the
behavior of many individuals and firms to the business environment. Our finding that
environmental stability promotes inertia and instability promotes impulsiveness suggests
that self-reinforcing effects can occur. A slight increase in environmental volatility may
increase the optimal impulsiveness of individuals’ and firms’ policies. This in turn will
tend to make the environment even less stable. Thus, aggregate shifts in the volatility
of economic choices such as investment may be disproportionate to observable causes.
37Some airlines have their flight attendants read a scripted statement, “Thank you for flying [name
of airline]. We realize you have a choice of carriers, and we appreciate your choosing [name of airline].”
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Appendix
In the model of Section 3, the algebraic details of the proof of the following lemma
are routine, and are omitted.
Lemma 1 (1) Let G′ denote the event φ′ = G. Then Pr(G′|G,L3) > Pr(G′|B,L3).
(2) Pr(G|H1H2L3) > Pr(G|A1A2L3). (3) Pr(G′|G,H3L4L5) > Pr(G′|B,H3L4L5). (4)
Pr(G|H1H2H3L4L5) > Pr(G|A1A2H3L4L5).
Intuitively, conditioning on the G rather than B state increases the probability that the
later state is G′; and conditioning on H1H2 is more favorable than conditioning on A1A2,
which may or may not have come from H1H2.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Date 3 Decisions: We will show that σN < σO, so that the region of excess impul-
siveness of the amnesiac player actually does exist. We first outline the argument. At
the end of period 2, the difference between H and L signals after HH or LL is 2 or
-2. For the amnesiac player, the sub-equivalent state after AA or RR is less than 2 in
absolute value, because the second action may have been the result of a coin flip. By
the definition of σN , the amnesiac player is virtually indifferent after AA followed by L
(or RR followed by H). HH is more favorable than AA, so it follows that the full-recall
player strongly prefers to follow the old signals after HH (or LL).
Pr(G′|AAL) = Pr(G′|AAL,G)Pr(G|AAL) + Pr(G′|AAL,B)Pr(B|AAL)
Pr(G′|HHL) = Pr(G′|HHL,G)Pr(G|HHL) + Pr(G′|HHL,B)Pr(B|HHL).
So
Pr(G′|AAL) = Pr(G′|L,G)Pr(G|AAL) + Pr(G′|L,B)[1− Pr(G|AAL)]
= [Pr(G′|L,G)− Pr(G′|L,B)]Pr(G|AAL) + Pr(G′|L,B),
P r(G′|HHL) = Pr(G′|L,G)Pr(G|HHL) + Pr(G′|L,B)[1− Pr(G|HHL)]
= [Pr(G′|L,G)− Pr(G′|L,B)]Pr(G|HHL) + Pr(G′|L,B).






So for p > 1/2 and σ > 0 small, the continuing I will always adopt after HHL. On the
other hand, if σ ≈ 1, then history is irrelevant, so I will always reject.
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So for p > 1/2 and σ ≈ 1, N always rejects after AAL.






















So if p > 1/2, N always accepts after AAL.
To summarize, as σ increases from 0 to 1, both Pr(G′|AAL) and Pr(G′|HHL),
decrease from greater than 1/2 to less than 1/2. Since Pr(G′|AAL) < Pr(G′|HHL)
for all σ ∈ [0, 1), it follows by continuity of these probabilities in σ that for all p > 1/2
there exists a value of σ ∈ [0, 1) such that Pr(G′|AAL) < 1/2 and Pr(G′|HHL) > 1/2.
Thus, for some σ N rejects after AAL while I accepts after HHL.
Date 4 Decisions: After two pretransition adoptions, so long as σ > 0 both I and N
will always follow identical date 3 and 4 signals. (If σ = 0, then I who observed H1H2
will flip a coin after L3L4, which contributes to inertia.) After H3L4 or L3H4, I who
observed pretransition H1L2 tosses a coin and may reject. In contrast, so long as σ < 1,
N always adopts since the pretransition signals could be either HH or HL. Thus, there
is inertia if σ < 1, and first best behavior if σ = 1.
Date 5 Decisions: We compare the behavior of N versus I when I follows like actions
for two dates, A1A2 (the results are symmetric for R1R2). A1A2 could arise either from
H1H2, or from H1L2 with a coin flip. At date 5, when at least two of next three signals
after transition date are H (H3H4H5, H3H4L5, H3L4H5, and L3H4H5), both N and
I adopt. When all three of them are L (L3L4L5), both reject. When one of them is
H and the other two are L (H3L4L5, L3H4L5, and L3L4H5), their decisions can differ
depending on the transition probability σ. Therefore, we focus on decisions when one of
post-transition signals is H and the other two are L.
Low σ: In the case of a fully stable environment (σ = 0). In an amnesiac scenario,
N adopts because of the higher likelihood that A1A2 came from H1H2 than from H1L2
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(therefore, it’s more likely that 3 out of 5 signals are H than 2 out of 5). But in a full
recall scenario, I who observed H1L2 will reject at date 5 since 3 out of 5 signals are L.
Medium σ: As σ increases, the relevance of old policies to date 5 decision weakens and
at some point, N switches from adoption to rejection. At that point, I who observed
H1H2 in first two periods still adopts since he knows A1A2 came from H1H2 and puts
higher probability on state being G′ than N does.
High σ: As σ increases further, I also rejects since the weight placed on first two H
signals becomes low. Both I and N behave identically in a highly unstable environment.





(the cases of L3H4L5 and L3L4H5 are similar). Expanding the conditional probabilities
gives
Pr(G′|A1A2H3L4L5) =
Pr(G′|A1A2H3L4L5, G)Pr(G|A1A2H3L4L5) + Pr(G′|A1A2H3L4L5, B)Pr(B|A1A2H3L4L5)
Pr(G′|H1H2H3L4L5) =
Pr(G′|H1H2H3L4L5, G)Pr(G|H1H2H3L4L5) + Pr(G′|H1H2H3L4L5, B)Pr(B|H1H2H3L4L5).
So
Pr(G′|A1A2H3L4L5) = Pr(G′|H3L4L5, G)Pr(G|A1A2H3L4L5)
+Pr(G′|H3L4L5, B)[1− Pr(G|A1A2H3L4L5)]
= [Pr(G′|H3L4L5, G)− Pr(G′|H3L4L5, B)]Pr(G|A1A2H3L4L5)
+Pr(G′|H3L4L5, B)
Pr(G′|H1H2H3L4L5) = Pr(G′|H3L4L5, G)Pr(G|H1H2H3L4L5)
+Pr(G′|H3L4L5, B)[1− Pr(G|H1H2H3L4L5)]
= [Pr(G′|H3L4L5, G)− Pr(G′|H3L4L5, B)]Pr(G|H1H2H3L4L5)
+Pr(G′|H3L4L5, B).






So for p > 1/2 and σ > 0 small, the continuing I will always adopt after H1H2H3L4L5.
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On the other hand, if σ ≈ 1, then history H1H2 is irrelevant, so I will always reject.






To summarize, as σ increases from 0 to 1, both Pr(G′|A1A2H3L4L5) and Pr(G′|H1H2H3L4L5),
decrease from greater than 1/2 to less than 1/2. Since, by Lemma 1, Pr(G′|A1A2H3L4L5) <
Pr(G′|H1H2H3L4L5) for all σ ∈ [0, 1), it follows by continuity of these probabilities in σ
that for all p > 1/2 there exists a value of σ ∈ [0, 1) such that Pr(G′|A1A2H3L4L5) < 1/2
and Pr(G′|H1H2H3L4L5) > 1/2. Thus, for some σ N rejects after A1A2H3L4L5 while I
accepts after H1H2H3L4L5. q.e.d.
The Multiperiod Model
In the multiperiod model of Section 4, without loss of generality we compute the
probability that a continuing I with full recall and a new N with amnesia switch actions
within t periods of the date of potential memory loss, after just having adopted for M
periods. The analysis is symmetric for past rejections.
Insert Table 5 here
Payoff Structure
The net gains each period from adopting or rejecting the current project are summa-
rized in Table 5. The net discounted value of the project is unknown, either v = 1 (G
value state) or v = −1 (B value state), equally probable and unknown to the players.
These are the payoffs obtained by adopting (undertaking the project). Rejecting the
project yields a payoff of 0 in both states. Abstaining from decision generates net pay-
offs of 0.5+ ε or −0.5+ ε (ε > 0 small) in states G and B respectively, which are halfway
between that from adopting and rejecting (plus ε). With ε small, the player abstains if
and only if he is (arbitrarily close to) indifferent between adopting and rejecting.
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The probability that I’s action changes is the likelihood of reaching signal-state
st = 0. The following two well-known lemmas about Markov processes are used in
subsequent analysis. Let θ be the probability of an up move. For notational simplicity,
we focus on the case of s0 > 0.
Lemma 2 Starting at position s0 > 0, the probability of reaching state st = 0 exactly
once at (and not before) time t is
a(s0, t, θ) =










Lemma 3 Starting at position s0 > 0, the probability of reaching state st = 0 at least
once (“absorption”) by time t is
A(s0, t, θ) =

0 if t < s0
















− 1, t, 1− θ
)
otherwise,
where B(·) is the cumulative binomial distribution,








The recursion implicit in the middle entry of A(·) must “bottom out” since moving
backwards from an odd value for t+ s0 must lead to an even value.
Given a sequence of M adopt decisions, the probability that the value state is G is
Pr(G|M, p) = Pr(M |G)Pr(G)
Pr(M |G)Pr(G) + Pr(M |B)Pr(B)
.
Lemmas 2 and 3 can be applied to compute Pr(M |G) and Pr(M |B). Any qualifying
signal sequence must lead at the start to 2 adopts, and thus must start with two H
signals. Then, starting at signal state 2, it must be followed by a signal sequence that
does not touch state s = 0 (observable abstention) within M − 2 periods. Thus,
Pr(M |G, p) = p2[1− A(2,M − 2, p)].
P r(M |B, p) = (1− p)2[1− A(2,M − 2, 1− p)], (1)
and Pr(G|M, p) becomes
Pr(G|M, p) = p
2[1− A(2,M − 2, p)]
p2[1− A(2,M − 2, p)] + (1− p)2[1− A(2,M − 2, 1− p)]
. (2)
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Let A(k, t, p) (calculated earlier) be the probability that I or N who starts in equiv-
alent state k receives enough low signals to make an action switch (abstain or beyond)
at least once within t periods.
I’s optimal decision is based on the difference in the number of H and L-signals. The
probability of an action switch by time t is the probability that the number of L-signals
equals the number of H-signals by time t. In Markov terms, this happens when the
particle reaches the (absorbing) boundary 0. Let
c(k;M, p) ≡ a(k,M, 1− p)
p2(1− A[2,M − 2, p])
, (k ≤M). (3)
We now verify that c(k;M, p) is the conditional probability of starting in state k,
given M prior adopts. We first compute the posterior probability of a player being in
state k given M adopts if the probability of an H signal is p (i.e., assuming for the
moment that the value state is G).
The numerator of equation (3) gives the probability of being in state k and having
M prior adopts. The denominator normalizes the probabilities. It exploits the fact that∑
k a(k,M, 1− p) = p2(1−A[2,M − 2, p]), because the first two signals must be H, and
no absorption may take place within the remaining M − 2 periods. It follows that the
probability that the initial player, having made exactly M successive adopt decisions,
switches action at least once within t periods is










c(k;M, 1− p)A(k, t, 1− p)
]
,
where c(k;M, p) is the probability that he is in state k given exactly M prior adopts.
The first term on the RHS conditions on the value state being good. If the value state
is good, I can be in state k, for which the probability is c(k;M, p). If he starts in state k,
the probability that he will reach state 0 (observable action reversal) is A(k, t, p). The
second term conditions on the value state being bad, and consequently, the probability
of observing a low signal is not p, but 1− p.
Since the equivalent state must be an integer, for continuous calculations it is useful
to define what we call the sub-equivalent state.
Definition Let ē be the equivalent state. A sub-equivalent state is defined as any real
number on the interval (ē− 1, ē], if ē > 0, and on the interval [ē, ē+ 1), if ē < 0.
Thus, I’s equivalent state is equal to the sub-equivalent state if the latter is an integer,
and to the next-larger-in-absolute-value integer if there is a fractional part.
The higher in absolute value is a player’s equivalent state, the less likely he is to switch
his action at least once within a given time period.38 At a pre-transition-date at which he
38Proof: the set of possible signal realizations that lead the player in a higher state to switch is a
subset of the set of possible signal realizations that lead the player in a lower state to switch.
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abstains, there are an equal number of H and L signals, which is uninformative. So the
relevant summary of pre-transition actions is just the number of immediately preceding
consecutive all-adopt (or all-reject) decisions. We therefore need only show, starting
with an arbitrary number M of all-adopt decisions, that N has a lower probability of
switching than I within an arbitrary t periods after the switch.
Let I be the information set the player has about events prior to the date of possible
player change. Let N be the signal sequence received by the player after the transition.
By Bayes’ rule, the decision rule for a player is abstain if
E(V |I,N ) ≡ Pr(N|G)Pr(I|G)
Pr(N|G)Pr(I|G) + Pr(N|B)Pr(I|B)
= 1/2,
reject if the expectation is less than 1/2, and adopt in the reverse case. Simplifying this
expression, the condition for abstaining becomes Pr(N|G)Pr(I|G) = Pr(N|B)Pr(I|B).
Let e be the sub-equivalent state. The equivalent state is the excess number of L-
signals over H-signals required to bring a player who has observed I back to indifference
(or beyond). In our Markov structure, Pr(N|G) = (1− p)e and Pr(N|B) = pe, so





Noninteger solutions for e give sub-equivalent states. Adding one more H signal to
I increases e by 1 regardless of the information in I. After one additional H signal,
Pr(I|G) is replaced by Pr(I|G)p; Pr(I|B) by Pr(I|B)(1− p). Thus, a player can act
by computing his state (or state inference) based on the last abstain decision—when I
was publicly known to be in state 0.
Finally, Pr(I|G) and Pr(I|B) are given by (1). The are the sums of the conditional
probabilities of all sequences that lead to uniform adopt decisions, i.e. that start with
two H-signals, and are followed by sequences that do not lead to absorption within M−2
periods. Therefore, the sub-equivalent state for N who has observed successive M adopt
decisions by I (and no signals of his own) is:








An action switch only occurs when the boundary of 0 is crossed. So if the sub-equivalent
state e is not an integer, the equivalent state is found by rounding up in absolute value.
By standard probability calculus, the probability that a new player, having observed
M successive adopt decisions, switches action within t periods after the transition is
rN(M, t, p) ≡ Pr(G|M)A(e[M, p], t, p) + Pr(B|M)A(e[M, p], t, 1− p). (6)
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The first term again conditions on the probability that the value state is good. A reversal
is observed if e[M, p] low signals are observed (which happens with probability A(ē, t, p)).
If the value state is bad, the probability of a low signal is 1− p instead of p.
Proof of Proposition 2: This follows directly from equations (3) and (5). q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 3:39 We begin with two lemmas.






Proof: Let πe be the probability that the value state is G given the sub-equivalent state
expression given above. (It is easy to show that there is a one-to-one map between the















by equation (4) for the sub-equivalent state, with I representing e pre-transition adop-
tions. Solving for e gives (7). q.e.d.
Let C denote the event that no reversal ever occurs, let C ′ be the complementary
event that reversal occurs, and let (πe) be the probability that the value state is G if the
player starts at sub-equivalent state e. Then:
Lemma 5 The cumulative asymptotic probability of ever observing a reversal given an
arbitrary number of past adoptions is Pr(C ′|e) = 2− 2πe.
Proof: The probability of observing a reversal as T → ∞ if I took the wrong action
is 1, so the probability of C is the probability πe that the action is correct given the
(unknown) value state (so that there is a drift away from zero) times the probability of




















 = 2πe − 1 .
q.e.d.
39This proof was pointed out to us by Larry Glosten.
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We now complete the proof of Proposition 3.





where AM denotes a sequence of M adopts. By Lemma 5, this can be simplified to
M∑
s=1






= 2 π̂M − 1 ,
where π̂M is the probability that the value state is G given M pre-transition adopts.
N: The equivalent state e is the sum of the sub-equivalent state e and a non-negative
























which is greater than 2πe − 1 when f > 0.
Part (ii): If there are M ′ periods prior to the memory transition, there could any number
from 0 through M ′ of consecutive immediate pre-transition adopt decisions. Conditional
on M ′, in some cases, both N and I will switch with equal probability; in other cases,
N will switch after I. Therefore the unconditional probability that I switches at least
once is greater than the probability that N switches at least once. q.e.d.
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Table 1: Conditional Signal Distribution Probabilities
Value State
Signal Value G B
H p 1− p
L 1− p p
Table 2: Equilibrium Date 3 Behavior with Amnesia or Full Recall in the
Basic Model (Given a Matched-Action History)
Low σ Medium σ High σ
(σ < σN) (σN < σ < σO) (σO < σ)
Amnesia Follow matched Follow latest Follow latest
pre-transition actions. signal. signal.
Full Recall Follow matched Follow matched Follow latest
pre-transition signals. pre-transition signals. signal.
Interpretation Inertia Impulsiveness First Best
Description: Under amnesia the player observes only the preceding two actions. Under full recall the
player observes the preceding two signals. ‘Matched actions’ are a pair of like actions at dates 1 and
2, i.e., (Adopt, Adopt) or (Reject, Reject). ‘Matched signals’ are a pair of like signals, i.e., HH or
LL. The table shows excess inertia for low σ, because under amnesia past matched actions are always
continued, whereas under full recall they are only sometimes continued. For medium σ, there is excess
impulsiveness, because under amnesia at date 3 the player always follows the latest signal without any
regard to past events, whereas under full recall the action is related to past information.
Table 3: Equilibrium Date 4 Behavior with Amnesia or Full Recall in the
Basic Model (Given a Matched-Action History)
Low σ Medium σ High σ
σ = 0 0 < σ < 1 σ = 1
Amnesia Follow matched Follow matched Follow matched
pre-transition actions latest signals latest signals
unless both signals oppose. (past actions if offsetting). (coin flip if
offsetting).
Full Recall Follow matched Follow matched Follow matched
pre-transition signals latest signals latest signals
(but coin flip if (past signals if latest offset, (coin flip if
later signals both oppose). coin flip if all signals offset) offsetting).
Interpretation Strong Inertia Inertia First Best
Description: Under amnesia the player observes only the preceding two actions. Under full recall the
player observes the preceding two signals. ‘Matched actions’ are a pair of like actions at dates 1 and 2,
i.e., (Adopt, Adopt) or (Reject, Reject). ‘Matched signals’ are a pair of like signals, i.e., HH or LL.
The table shows excess inertia for low and medium σ, because under amnesia past matched actions are
more likely to be influential under amnesia than under full recall.
Table 4: Equilibrium Date 5 Behavior with Amnesia or Full Recall in the
Basic Model (Given a Matched-Action History)
Low σ Medium σ High σ





of three recent signals
Follow preponderance
of three recent signals
Full Recall Follow preponderance
of all five signals
Follow preponderance
of all five signals
Follow preponderance
of three recent signals
Interpretation Inertia Impulsiveness First Best
Description: Under amnesia the player observes only the preceding two actions. Under full recall the
player observes the preceding two signals. ‘Matched actions’ are a pair of like actions at dates 1 and 2,
i.e., (Adopt, Adopt) or (Reject, Reject). ‘Matched signals’ are a pair of like signals, i.e., HH or LL.
The table shows excess inertia for low σ, because under amnesia past matched actions are likely to be
continued unless there are three opposing signals, whereas under full recall several less extreme signal
outcomes cause an action change. For medium σ, there is excess impulsiveness, because under amnesia
at date 3 the player only follows recent signals, whereas under full recall past information also carries
weight.
Table 5: Payoffs in the Multiperiod Model
Value State
Action G B
Adopt A 1 -1
Reject R 0 0
Abstain ∅ ε+ 1/2 ε− 1/2
